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Abstract
We introduce a “reason-based” way of rationalizing an agent’s choice behaviour,
which explains choices by specifying which properties of the options or choice context
the agent cares about (the “motivationally salient properties”) and how he or she
cares about these properties (the “fundamental preference relation”). Reason-based
rationalizations can explain non-classical choice behaviour, including boundedly ra-
tional and sophisticated rational behaviour, and predict choices in unobserved con-
texts, an issue neglected in standard choice theory. We characterize the behavioural
implications of diﬀerent reason-based models and distinguish two kinds of context-
dependent motivation: “context-variant” motivation, where the agent cares about
diﬀerent properties in diﬀerent contexts, and “context-regarding” motivation, where
the agent cares not only about properties of the options, but also about properties
relating to the context.
1 Introduction
The classical theory of individual choice faces many notorious problems. It is chal-
lenged by empirically well-established violations of rationality due to framing eﬀects,
menu-dependent choice, susceptibility to nudges, the use of heuristics, unawareness, and
other related phenomena. For example, a mere redescription of the same options can
sometimes alter an agent’s choice behaviour. Call this the problem of bounded rational-
ity. The classical theory is also challenged by its inability to explain various intuitively
rational but sophisticated forms of choice, such as choices based on norm-following or
non-consequentialism. It does not distinguish such sophisticated choices from ordinary
∗This work has been presented on numerous occasions, beginning with the LSE Choice Group
workshop on “Rationalizability and Choice”, July 2011. We thank the audiences at these occa-
sions for helpful comments and suggestions.
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rationality violations. For example, someone who always chooses the second-largest
(rather than largest) piece of cake oﬀered to him (or her) for politeness violates the
weak axiom of revealed preference and thus counts as “irrational” in the classical sense.
Call this the problem of sophisticated rationality. We suggest that the classical theory’s
diﬃculty in addressing both problems stems from the lack of a model of how agents
conceptualize options in any given choice context. When we provide such a model, a
uniﬁed explanation of many of the challenging phenomena can be given.
Our basic idea is the following. When an agent chooses between several options in
some context, e.g., diﬀerent yoghurts in a supermarket, he (or she) conceptualizes each
option not as a primitive object, but as a bundle of properties. Each option can have
a large number of properties; however, the agent considers not all of them, but only a
subset: the motivationally salient properties. In the supermarket, these may include
whether the yoghurt is fruit-ﬂavoured, low-fat, and free from artiﬁcial sweeteners, but
exclude whether the yoghurt has an odd (as opposed to even) number of letters on its
label (an irrelevant property), and whether it has been sustainably produced (which
many consumers ignore). The agent then makes his choice on the basis of a fundamental
preference relation over property bundles. He chooses one option over another, e.g., a
low-fat cherry yoghurt over a full-fat, sugar-free vanilla one, if and only if his fundamental
preference relation ranks the set of motivationally salient properties of the ﬁrst option,
say {low-fat, fruit-ﬂavoured}, above the set of motivationally salient properties of the
second, say {full-ﬂat, vanilla-ﬂavoured, artiﬁcially sweetened}.
We call an agent’s choice behaviour reason-based rationalizable if it can be explained
in this way. A reason-based rationalization, as we deﬁne it, explains an agent’s choice
behaviour by specifying (i) which properties the agent cares about in each choice context
and (ii) how he cares about these properties. We formalize part (i) by a motivational
salience function, which assigns to each context a set of motivationally salient properties,
and part (ii) by the agent’s fundamental preference relation over property bundles.
Crucially, the motivationally salient properties may be of diﬀerent kinds. They may
include not only option properties, which options have independently of the choice con-
text (philosophers would call them “intrinsic” properties), but also relational properties,
which options have relative to the context, and context properties, which are proper-
ties of the context alone. “Being fruit-ﬂavoured” and “being low-fat” (in the case of
yoghurts) are option properties; they depend solely on the yoghurt itself. Whether a
yoghurt is the only cherry yoghurt on display or the cheapest one in the supermarket
are relational properties; they depend also on the other available yoghurts. Examples
of context properties, ﬁnally, are whether the yoghurts on oﬀer include luxury brands
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(this depends solely on the menu of options) and whether there is cheerful music in the
background (this depends on features of the context over and above the menu).
Reason-based rationalizations can capture two kinds of context-dependence in an
agent’s motivation. First, the context may aﬀect which properties are motivationally
salient, so that the agent cares about diﬀerent properties in diﬀerent contexts. We
call this context-variant motivation. For example, some contexts make the agent diet-
conscious, others not. Second, the motivationally salient properties may go beyond
option properties and include relational or context properties, so that the agent cares
explicitly about the context or about how the options relate to it. We call this context-
regarding motivation. For example, the agent cares about whether the choice of an option
is polite in the given context or whether there are luxury options available.
Many boundedly rational and sophisticated rational forms of choice can be explained
by these two kinds of context-dependence. Arguably, bounded rationality, such as sus-
ceptibility to framing, nudging, or dynamic inconsistency, often involves context-variant
motivation. Sophisticated rationality, such as norm-following or non-consequentialism,
often involves context-regarding motivation. (Of course, we do not claim that context-
variance is always boundedly rational or that context-regardingness is always sophisti-
cated.)
Note that, while we suggest that agents conceptualize options as bundles of moti-
vationally salient properties, we could not deﬁne each option directly as a bundle of
motivationally salient properties. Since an agent may conceptualize the same option in
terms of diﬀerent properties in diﬀerent contexts, we cannot know the agent’s motiva-
tionally salient properties ex ante; they can be inferred, at most, after observing the
agent’s choices (see Bhattacharyya, Pattanaik, and Xu 2011 for a similar observation).
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our basic framework
and discuss some examples. In Section 3, we examine the choice-behavioural implications
of the two kinds of context-dependence. In Section 4, we show how choice behaviour can
reveal which properties are motivationally salient and what the fundamental preference
relation is. In Section 5, we explore the prediction of choices in unobserved contexts, a
largely neglected topic in standard choice theory. Importantly, the build-up in the early
sections is needed in order to harvest the fruits of our approach in the later sections.
To the best of our knowledge, our framework is novel. There is, of course, a grow-
ing body of works in decision theory oﬀering non-standard approaches to rationaliza-
tion (e.g., Suzumura and Xu 2001; Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler 2002; Manzini and
Mariotti 2007, 2012; Salant and Rubinstein 2008; Bernheim and Rangel 2009; Man-
dler, Manzini, and Mariotti 2012; Cherepanov, Feddersen, and Sandroni 2013). In the
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Appendix, we brieﬂy discuss two conceptually related papers by Bossert and Suzumura
(2009) and Bhattacharyya, Pattanaik, and Xu (2011) about the phenomenon of context-
dependence. Our model oﬀers a response to problems identiﬁed by them. It also formal-
izes a distinction drawn by Rubinstein (2006) between diﬀerent reasons for choice, which
parallels our distinction between context-regarding and context-unregarding motivation.
More extensive reviews of the literature can be found in our earlier papers on preference
formation (Dietrich and List 2012, 2013a,b; Dietrich 2012) and in the monograph by
Bossert and Suzumura (2010).1
2 A general framework
2.1 Observable primitives
Our observable primitives are the following:
• A non-empty set of options, denoted X. Typical elements are x, y, z, ...
• A non-empty set of contexts, denoted K, which can be deﬁned in two ways. On
the classical (“extensional”) deﬁnition, each context K ∈ K is a non-empty set
K ⊆ X of feasible options, which the agent may choose from. On a more general
(“non-extensional”) deﬁnition, each context K ∈ K induces a non-empty feasible
set [K] ⊆ X, but may carry additional information about the choice environment.
Formally, K could be a pair (Y, λ) of a feasible set Y (=[K]) and an environmental
parameter λ, representing a cue, default criterion, room temperature, background
music, or even the psychological or bodily state of the agent (e.g., sober or drunk).
(This resembles the notion of a frame or “set of ancillary conditions” in Salant
and Rubinstein 2008 or Bernheim and Rangel 2009.) For simplicity, we write K
for [K]. This creates no ambiguity, as it is always clear whether K refers to the
context broadly deﬁned or to the feasible set [K] (e.g., in “x∈K”, K refers to [K]).
1In Dietrich and List (2013a,b), we investigated the relationship between motivationally salient prop-
erties (“reasons”) and preferences (related contributions on the logic of preferences include Liu 2010 and
Osherson and Weinstein 2012). The present paper goes signiﬁcantly beyond those earlier papers, and
there is no overlap in results. In particular, (i) we treat “motivationally salient properties” no longer
as primitives, but as derivable from observable data; (ii) our main observable primitive is now a choice
function, which we seek to explain; (iii) we now introduce relational and context properties, which allow
us us to consider two kinds of context-dependence; and (iv) we develop a framework for predictions
of future choices. For a philosophical discussion of some limitations of classical rational choice theory,
which also supports our current “reason-based” perspective, see Pettit (1991).
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• A choice function C : K → 2X , which assigns to each context K ∈ K a non-empty
set of chosen options in K (i.e., C(K) ⊆ K).
2.2 Properties
When making a choice in context K, an agent eﬀectively selects among diﬀerent pairs
of the form (x,K), where x ∈ K. We call the elements of X × K option-context pairs.2
In our framework, the properties of option-context pairs are key determinants of the
agent’s choice. A property is a characteristic that an option-context pair may or may
not have (thus properties are binary). Formally, it is an abstract object, P , that picks
out a subset [P ] ⊆ X ×K called its extension, which consists of all option-context pairs
that “have” or “satisfy” the property. We assume that the extension of any property is
distinct from ∅ and X × K; this rules out properties that are never satisﬁed or always
satisﬁed.
Although we often identify a property with its extension, it is sometimes useful to
allow distinct properties to have the same extension, so as to capture those framing
eﬀects in which the description of a property matters. For example, the properties “80%
fat-free” and “20% fat” (in foods) have the same extension but diﬀerent descriptions
and may prompt diﬀerent choice dispositions in a boundedly rational agent.
We distinguish between three kinds of properties:
Option properties: These are properties whose possession by an option-context pair
depends only on the option, not on the context. Examples are “being fat-free” or “being
a 500g pot” (in the case of yoghurts) and “being an apple” (in the case of fruits).
Formally, P is an option property if
(x,K) ∈ [P ] ⇔ (x,K ′) ∈ [P ] for all x ∈ X and K,K ′ ∈ K.
Context properties: These are properties whose possession by an option-context pair
depends only on the context, not on the option. Examples are “oﬀering more than one
feasible option”, “oﬀering a Rolls Royce among the feasible options”, and – if contexts
are deﬁned as specifying the choice environment over and above the feasible set – the
time, room temperature, or framing of the choice problem. Formally, P is a context
property if
(x,K) ∈ [P ] ⇔ (x′,K) ∈ [P ] for all x, x′ ∈ X and K ∈ K.
2Note that some pairs (x,K) in X ×K are “infeasible” in the sense that x /∈ K.
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Relational properties: These are properties whose possesion by an option-context
pair depends on both the option and the context, capturing the relationship between
option and context. Examples are “not being the last available fruit of a particular
kind”, which a polite dinner party guest may care about, or “being the largest item on
the menu”, which a greedy consumer may focus on. Formally, P is a relational property
if it is neither an option property nor a context property.
We call properties that are not option properties context-regarding and properties
that are not context properties option-regarding. Relational properties are context-
regarding and option-regarding.
To explain an agent’s choice behaviour, we consider a set P of potentially relevant
properties, called a property system. This could be speciﬁed in diﬀerent ways, depending
on the modeller’s goals. It contains the properties that the modeller has at his or her
disposal to rationalize the agent’s choices. The slimmer this set, the fewer patterns of
choice can be explained, i.e., the more demanding our notion of reason-based rationaliz-
ability becomes. We partition P into the set Poption of option properties, the set Pcontext
of context properties, and the set Prelational of relational properties. For any option x
and any context K, we write
• P(x,K) for the set {P ∈ P : (x,K) ∈ [P ]} of all properties of the pair (x,K),
• P(x) = P(x,K) ∩ Poption for the set of option properties of x, and
• P(K) = P(x,K) ∩ Pcontext for the set of context properties of K.
Each set P(x,K) is assumed to be ﬁnite. (Of course, X, K, and P need not be ﬁnite.)
A subset of P is called a property bundle.
2.3 An example
We give an example to which we will refer repeatedly. It involves a choice of fruit at
a dinner party (as in Sen’s well-known example of a polite dinner-party guest). Let X
contain diﬀerent fruits: apples, bananas, chocolate-covered pears, and possibly others.
Each kind of fruit comes in up to three sizes: big, medium, and small. A choice context
is a non-empty feasible set K ⊆ X, consisting of fruits currently in the basket. The set of
possible contexts is K = 2X\{∅}. For present purposes, we consider a set of properties
P = {big, medium, small, chocolate-oﬀering, polite}, where
• “big”, “medium”, and “small” are the option properties of being a big, medium,
and small fruit, respectively;
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• “chocolate-oﬀering” is the context property of oﬀering at least one chocolate-
covered fruit among the feasible options;
• “polite” is the relational property of not being the last available fruit of its kind,
i.e., not being the last apple in the basket, the last banana, the last chocolate-
covered pear, and so on.
We consider four agents whose choice behaviour we will subsequently explain in terms
of the properties in P.
Bon-vivant Bonnie always chooses a largest available fruit. For any K, she chooses
C(K) = {x ∈ K : x is largest in K},
where “medium” is larger than “small”, and “big” is larger than both other sizes.
Polite Pauline politely avoids choosing the last available fruit of its kind and only
secondarily cares about a fruit’s size. For any K, she chooses
C(K) = {x ∈ K : x is largest in K∗ if K∗ = ∅ and largest in K if K∗ = ∅},
where K∗ is the set of all fruits in K that are not the last available ones of their kind.
Chocoholic Coco picks any fruit indiﬀerently when no chocolate-covered fruit is avail-
able, but otherwise chooses a largest available fruit, because the smell of chocolate makes
him hungry. For any K, he chooses
C(K) =
{
K if no chocolate-covered fruit is available in K,
{x ∈ K : x is largest in K} if a chocolate-covered fruit is available in K.
Weak-willed William makes the same polite choices as Pauline when no chocolate-
covered fruit is available, and the same “greedy” choices as Bonnie otherwise, as the
smell of chocolate makes him lose his inhibitions. Formally, C(K) is as in Pauline’s case
when there is no chocolate-covered fruit in K and as in Bonnie’s case when there is.
To explain the behaviour of these agents, we now introduce our central concept.
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2.4 Reason-based models
A reason-based model of an agent, M, is a pair (M,≥) consisting of:
• Amotivational salience function M (formally a function from K into 2P), which as-
signs to each contextK ∈ K a setM(K) ofmotivationally salient properties in con-
text K. We require that any contexts with the same context properties induce the
same motivationally salient properties, i.e., if P(K)=P(K ′) then M(K)=M(K ′).
(So, diﬀerences in motivation are attributable to diﬀerences in context properties.)
• A fundamental preference relation ≥ over property bundles (formally a binary
relation on 2P , on which we initially impose no restrictions). We write > and ≡
for the strict and indiﬀerence relations induced by ≥.
Informally, M speciﬁes which properties the agent cares about in each context, and
≥ speciﬁes how the agent cares about these properties, by ranking diﬀerent property
bundles relative to one another. Note that a reason-based model is always deﬁned
relative to a given property system P.
A reason-based model tells us (i) how the agent conceptualizes options in each con-
text, (ii) how he forms his preferences over the options, and (iii) what choices he is
disposed to make. Formally, according to M:
• Any option x is conceptualized in context K as the set of motivationally salient
properties of (x,K), denoted xK = P(x,K) ∩M(K).
• The agent’s preference relation in contextK is the binary relation K onX deﬁned
as follows:
x K y ⇔ xK ≥ yK for all x, y ∈ X.
We write 
K and ∼K for the strict and indiﬀerence relations induced by K .
• The agent’s choice dispositions are given by the function CM : K → 2X which
assigns to each context the set of most preferred feasible options in that context:
CM(K) = {x ∈ K : x K y for all y ∈ K}.
This deﬁnes an improper choice function (“improper” because CM(K) may be
empty for some K if ≥ is not well-behaved).
We call a choice function C : K → 2X reason-based rationalizable (relative to P) if there
exists a reason-based model M (relative to P) such that C = CM. We then call M
a rationalization of C. The four choice functions of our example are all reason-based
rationalizable, as we now show.
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Bon-vivant Bonnie’s choice function can be rationalized by deﬁning the set of
motivationally salient properties in any context K as
M(K) = {big, medium, small} (so M is a constant function),
and deﬁning the fundamental preference relation≥ such that the three singleton property
bundles {big}, {medium}, and {small} stand in the linear order satisfying
{big} > {medium} > {small}.3
For instance, in a context K that oﬀers only a small apple a and a big banana b, Bonnie
chooses the banana b. She conceptualizes the two fruits as
aK = P(a,K) ∩M(K) = {small},
bK = P(b,K) ∩M(K) = {big},
and bK K aK since {big} > {small}.
Polite Pauline’s choice function can be rationalized by deﬁning the set of motiva-
tionally salient properties in any context K as
M(K) = {big, medium, small, polite} (so, again, M is a constant function),
and deﬁning the fundamental preference relation ≥ such that the property bundles
{big, polite}, {medium, polite}, {small, polite}, {big}, {medium} and {small} stand in
the linear order satisfying
{big, polite} > {medium, polite} > {small, polite} > {big} > {medium} > {small}.
For instance, if only two small apples a and a′ and one big banana b are available in
context K, Pauline chooses an apple. She conceptualizes the three fruits as
aK = P(a,K) ∩M(K) = {small, polite},
a′K = P(a′,K) ∩M(K) = {small, polite},
bK = P(b,K) ∩M(K) = {big},
where aK ∼K a′K K bK since {small, polite} ≡ {small, polite} > {big}.
3Formally, ≥ = {({big},{big}), ({big},{medium}), ({big},{small}), ({medium},{medium}),
({medium},{small}), ({small},{small})}.
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Chocoholic Coco’s choice function can be rationalized by deﬁning the set of mo-
tivationally salient properties in any context K as
M(K) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∅ if no chocolate-covered fruit is available in K,
i.e., chocolate-oﬀering /∈ P(K),
{big, medium, if a chocolate-covered fruit is available in K,
small} i.e., chocolate-oﬀering ∈ P(K),
and deﬁning the fundamental preference relation ≥ as in Bonnie’s case, with the only
additional stipulation that ∅ ≡ ∅. For instance, in a context without a tempting
chocolate-covered fruit, he picks any fruit indiﬀerently, because he conceptualizes every
fruit as the same empty property bundle ∅, where ∅ ≡ ∅.
Weak-willed William’s choice function can be rationalized by deﬁning the set of
motivationally salient properties in any context K as
M(K) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
{big, medium, if no chocolate-covered fruit is available in K,
small, polite} i.e., chocolate-oﬀering /∈ P(K),
{big, medium, if a chocolate-covered fruit is available in K,
small} i.e., chocolate-oﬀering ∈ P(K),
and deﬁning the fundamental preference relation ≥ as in Pauline’s case. So, if context
K oﬀers only two small apples a and a′ and one big banana b, then, undisturbed by any
smell of chocolate, he conceptualizes these fruits as Pauline does and politely chooses a
small apple. If a small chocolate-covered pear is added to the basket, he conceptualizes
the fruits as Bonnie does and chooses the big banana.
2.5 Two kinds of context-dependent motivation
In our example, Polite Pauline and Chocoholic Coco are aﬀected by the context in
opposite ways. Pauline cares about the context, since the relational property “polite” is
motivationally salient for her. Coco’s set of motivationally salient properties varies with
the context: diﬀerent contexts make him care about diﬀerent properties. We say that
an agent’s motivation, according to model M = (M,≥), is
• context-regarding if the range of the motivational salience function M includes not
only sets of option properties (i.e., M(K) contains at least one context-regarding
property for some K ∈ K), and context-unregarding otherwise;
• context-variant if M is a non-constant function (i.e., M(K) is not the same for all
K ∈ K), and context-invariant otherwise.
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How do the two kinds of context-dependence aﬀect an agent’s conceptualization of the
options in each context?
Case 1. Both kinds of context-dependence are permitted: Any option x is
conceptualized in context K as
xK = P(x,K) ∩M(K).
This expression involves the context in two places. It involves (i) the set of properties
of the option-context pair (x,K), which may include context-regarding properties, and
(ii) the set of motivationally salient properties in context K, which may depend on K.
Case 2. Context-unregarding motivation: The ﬁrst source of context-dependence
disappears. Any option x is conceptualized in context K as
xK = P(x) ∩M(K),
since each M(K) only contains option properties, so that P(x,K) ∩ M(K) = P(x) ∩
M(K).
Case 3. Context-invariant motivation: The second source of context-dependence
disappears. Any option x is conceptualized in context K as
xK = P(x,K) ∩M,
since M is a constant function, so that M(K) can be replaced by a single set M of
motivationally salient properties. Here the ﬁrst component of the reason-based model
(M,≥) can be redeﬁned simply as this ﬁxed set M .
Case 4. No context-dependence: Both sources of context-dependence disappear.
Any option x is conceptualized in context K as
xK = P(x) ∩M .
Table 1 summarizes the four cases. Interpretationally, Pauline and Bonnie, whose
motivation is context-invariant, seem more rational than William and Coco, whose mo-
tivation varies with the context, prompted by subtle environmental features such as the
smell of chocolate. Bonnie exempliﬁes the case of classical rationality: context-invariant
motivation and context-unregarding conceptualization of the options. Pauline displays
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sophisticated rational behaviour: she considers not only properties of the options, but
also properties concerning the relationship between the options and the context, such as
politeness. William tries to display the same sophisticated behaviour, but is susceptible
to variations in motivation across diﬀerent contexts. Coco, ﬁnally, focuses only on option
properties, but, like William, lacks a stable motivation.
Context-variant motivation?
Yes No
Context-regarding
motivation?
Yes
xK = P(x,K) ∩M(K)
(e.g., William)
xK = P(x,K) ∩M
(e.g., Pauline)
No
xK = P(x) ∩M(K)
(e.g., Coco)
xK = P(x) ∩M
(e.g., Bonnie)
Table 1: The agent’s conceptualization of option x in context K
2.6 Some illustrative non-classical choice behaviours
To illustrate that many non-classical choice behaviours can be represented in our frame-
work, we brieﬂy consider framing eﬀects, choices by heuristics or checklists, and non-
consequentialist choices.
Framing eﬀects: Framing eﬀects can be understood as special kinds of choice rever-
sals. A choice reversal occurs when there are contexts K and K ′ and options x and y
such that x is chosen over y in K and y is chosen over x in K ′, where at least one choice is
strict. (Option x is chosen weakly over option y in context K if x, y ∈ K and x ∈ C(K);
and strictly if, in addition, y /∈ C(K).) Choice reversals can have two distinct sources,
according to a reason-based rationalization of C. Their source is context-variance if K
and K ′ induce diﬀerent sets of motivationally salient properties M(K) = M(K ′) both
of which contain only option properties. Their source is context-regardingness if K and
K ′ induce the same set M(K) = M(K ′), but this set contains some relational or context
properties that distinguish the choice between x and y in the two contexts. (There are
also mixed cases.) In either case, the agent prefers x to y as conceptualized in context
K, and y to x as conceptualized in context K ′, as illustrated in Figure 1. We might
deﬁne a framing eﬀect as a choice reversal whose source is context-variance, and deﬁne
the frame in each context K as the set of context properties P(K) “responsible” for
M(K). (In Section 5, we introduce a notion of causally relevant context properties that
could be used to reﬁne this deﬁnition.) Crucially, whether a choice reversal counts as a
framing eﬀect depends on the reason-based model by which we rationalize C. Note that,
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Figure 1: A choice reversal
if K and K ′ oﬀer the same feasible options, framing eﬀects can occur only if contexts
are deﬁned non-extensionally, as consisting of both a feasible set and an environmental
parameter (as in Salant and Rubinstein 2008); otherwise M(K) and M(K ′) would have
to coincide. If K and K ′ oﬀer diﬀerent feasible options, framing eﬀects are possible
even when contexts are deﬁned extensionally, provided they are distinguished by some
context properties (such as “oﬀering luxury goods”) that lead to the diﬀerence between
M(K) and M(K ′).
Checklists or “take-the-best” heuristics: Here, the agent considers a list of criteria
by which the options can be distinguished and places the criteria in some order of
importance. For any set of feasible options, the agent ﬁrst compares the options in
terms of the ﬁrst criterion; if there are ties, he moves on to the second criterion; if there
are still ties, he moves on to the third; and so on. Gigerenzer et al. (e.g., 2000) describe
empirical examples of such choice procedures, and Mandler, Manzini, and Mariotti (e.g.,
2012) oﬀer a formal analysis. In our framework, we can rationalize such choice behaviour
by a reason-based model (M,≥) with a lexicographic fundamental preference relation
≥, where property bundles are ranked on the basis of some order of importance over
properties. To illustrate, let P1, P2, P3, ... denote the ﬁrst, second, third, ..., properties
in this order (assuming a ﬁnite P). We can deﬁne the fundamental preference relation ≥
as follows: for any property bundles S1 and S2, S1 ≥ S2 if and only if either S1 = S2 or
there is some n such that Pn ∈ S1, Pn /∈ S2, and S1∩{P1, ..., Pn−1} = S2∩{P1, ..., Pn−1}.
A lexicographic fundamental preference relation can be combined with either context-
variant or context-invariant motivation, and with either context-regarding or context-
unregarding motivation. This opens up greater generality than usually acknowledged.
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Non-consequentialism: A non-consequentialist agent, in the most general sense,
makes a choice in a given context not just on the basis of the chosen option itself
(the outcome), but also on the basis of what the choice context is or how each option
relates to that context (the act of choosing the option). Any context-regarding moti-
vation can thus be associated with a form of non-consequentialism. More narrowly, we
may consider an agent who cares about whether each option is “permissible” or “norm-
conforming” in a given context. The relevant criterion may be politeness, legality, or
moral permissibility in the context. Let us introduce a relational property P such that
any option-context pair (x,K) satisﬁes P if and only if the choice of x is deemed per-
missible or norm-conforming in context K. If P is in every M(K) and the fundamental
preference relation ranks property bundles that include P above bundles that do not, the
agent will always choose a permissible or norm-conforming option, unless no such option
is feasible. Note that this could not generally be modelled without context-regarding mo-
tivation. For earlier discussions of non-consequentialist and “norm-conditional” choices,
see, e.g., Suzumura and Xu (2001) and Bossert and Suzumura (2009).
3 Choice-behavioural implications
When does a choice function C : K → 2X have a reason-based rationalization? In
this section, we ﬁrst give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for reason-based rational-
izability without any restriction, permitting both context-variant and context-regarding
motivation. We then characterize the opposite case, without any context-dependence.
Finally, we address the two intermediate cases, where rationalizability is restricted to
either context-invariant or context-unregarding motivation but not both. We also sug-
gest criteria for selecting a rationalization when it is not unique. The reader may skip
this section if he or she is interested primarily in constructing reason-based models from
observed choices (Section 4) or in predicting choices in novel contexts (Section 5).
3.1 Reason-based rationalizability without any restriction
We begin by stating two axioms which, together, imply that choice is based on properties.
The ﬁrst is an “intra-context” axiom. It states that the agent’s choice in any given
context does not distinguish between options that have the same bundle of properties in
that context:
Axiom 1 For all contexts K ∈ K and all options x, y ∈ K, if P(x,K) = P(y,K), then
x ∈ C(K) ⇔ y ∈ C(K).
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The second axiom is an “inter-context” axiom. It states that if two contexts oﬀer
the same feasible property bundles, the agent chooses options with the same property
bundles in those contexts:
Axiom 2 For all contexts K,K ′ ∈ K, if {P(x,K) : x ∈ K} = {P(x,K ′) : x ∈ K ′}, then
{P(x,K) : x ∈ C(K)} = {P(x,K ′) : x ∈ C(K ′)}.
Axiom 2 does not require that the same options be chosen in contexts oﬀering the
same feasible property bundles; it only requires that options instantiating the same
property bundles be chosen. The axiom requires no relationship between the choices in
contexts K and K ′ with diﬀerent context properties (i.e., P(K) = P(K ′)), since these
automatically oﬀer diﬀerent feasible property bundles.
Axioms 1 and 2 do not by themselves imply any maximizing behaviour.4 This gap
is ﬁlled by our third axiom, a variant of Richter’s (1971) axiom of “revelation coher-
ence” (which, in turn, is a weakening of the weak axiom of revealed preference; see,
e.g., Samuelson 1948). Unlike Richter, we formulate our axiom at the level of property
bundles, not options. We adapt some revealed-preference terminology. For any property
bundles S and S′:
• S is feasible in context K if S = P(x,K) for some feasible option x ∈ K;
• S is chosen in context K if S = P(x,K) for some option x ∈ C(K);
• S is revealed weakly preferred to S′ (formally S C S′) if, in some context, S is
chosen while S′ is feasible; S is revealed strictly preferred to S′ if, in some context,
S is chosen while S′ is feasible and not chosen.5
4They are jointly equivalent to choice being rationalizable by a generalized reason-based model, deﬁned
by (i) a motivational salience function and (ii) a choice function deﬁned on property bundles, not on
options (which is more general than a fundamental preference relation ≥ over property bundles).
5We speak of “revealed preference” rather than “revealed fundamental preference” to avoid giving
the impression that the relation C expresses the agent’s fundamental preferences. When the agent
revealed-prefers bundle S to bundle S′ by choosing the former over the latter in some context, only certain
subsets of S and S′ are typically motivationally salient in that context, and the agent’s fundamental
preference is held between these subsets, not between S and S′. In Section 4, we introduce a notion of
revealed fundamental preference. Our deﬁnition of revealed preference as a relation C between property
bundles induces (and is equivalent to) a deﬁnition of context-variant revealed preference between options
(denoted CK). Option x is revealed weakly preferred to option y in context K (x CK y) if and only if
P(x,K) C P(y,K). In classical choice theory, without the resources of properties, it is hard to deﬁne
an interesting notion of context-variant revealed preference. The classical revealed-preference relation is
deﬁned context-invariantly and fails to rationalize many observable choice behaviours.
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Axiom 3 If a property bundle S ⊆ P is feasible in some context K ∈ K and is revealed
weakly preferred to every feasible property bundle in context K, then S is chosen in
context K.
Like Axiom 2, Axiom 3 is less restrictive than one might think. For the choices
in context K to constrain those in context K ′, the two contexts must have the same
context properties, i.e., P(K) = P(K ′). Otherwise there will no property bundles that
are feasible in both K and K ′. In fact:
Lemma 1 Axiom 3 strengthens Axiom 2.
Theorem 1 A choice function C is reason-based rationalizable if and only if it satisﬁes
Axioms 1 and 3 (and by implication 2).6
This result, like all subsequent results, holds for each property system P. We can
thus test for rationalizability in diﬀerent property systems, e.g., by asking: Is the agent’s
choice between cars rationalizable in a system of colour-related properties? In a system
of prestige-related properties? In a system of prestige- and price-related properties?7
Reason-based rationalizations need not be unique. For a given choice function C,
there may exist more than one reason-based model M such that C = CM. Diﬀerent
rationalizations are far from equivalent, as discussed in more detail later. In particular,
they may lead to diﬀerent predictions for novel choice contexts outside the set K of
“observed” contexts, as shown in Section 5. We now reduce and later (in Section 4)
eliminate the non-uniqueness ofM, by imposing additional restrictions on the admissible
reason-based models.
3.2 Reason-based rationalizability without any context-dependence
So far, we have allowed rationalizations to display both kinds of context-dependence. We
now consider the opposite, limiting case with no context-dependence at all. Consider the
following variants of Axioms 1 and 2, obtained by referring only to context-unregarding
properties:
6The conjunction of Axioms 1 and 3 is in fact equivalent to the following single axiom: for every
context K ∈ K and every option x ∈ K, if the property bundle P(x,K) is revealed weakly preferred to
the property bundle P(y,K) for every option y ∈ K, then x ∈ C(K).
7To make this explicit, we could restate Theorem 1 (and similarly other results) as follows: For every
property system P, a choice function C is reason-based rationalizable in P if and only if it satisﬁes
Axioms 1 and 3 (and thereby 2).
16
Axiom 1* For all contexts K ∈ K and all options x, y ∈ K, if P(x) = P(y), then
x ∈ C(K) ⇔ y ∈ C(K).
Axiom 2* For all contexts K,K ′ ∈ K, if {P(x) : x ∈ K} = {P(x) : x ∈ K ′}, then
{P(x) : x ∈ C(K)} = {P(x) : x ∈ C(K ′)}.
In our example, Bon-vivant Bonnie satisﬁes both axioms; Chocoholic Coco satisﬁes
Axiom 1* but violates Axiom 2* (to see this, suppose K contains a chocolate-covered
pear whileK ′ does not); and Polite Pauline and Weak-willed William violate even Axiom
1* (they care about a relational property).
We also introduce an analogue of Axiom 3, namely Richter’s (1971) original ax-
iom of revelation coherence, extended to our framework where contexts (if deﬁned non-
extensionally) can be more general than feasible sets.
Axiom 3* For all contexts K ∈ K and any feasible option x ∈ K, if, for every option
y ∈ K, there is a context K ′ ∈ K in which x is chosen weakly over y, then x ∈ C(K).
To state our characterization of reason-based rationalizability without any context-
dependence, call the set of contexts K closed under cloning if K is closed under trans-
forming any context by adding “clones” of feasible options; formally, whenever a context
K ∈ K contains an option x such that P(x) = P(x′) for another option x′ ∈ X (a clone
of x), there is a context K ′ ∈ K such that K ′ = K ∪ {x′}. This is a weak condition.8
Theorem 2 Given a set of contexts K that is closed under cloning, a choice function C
is reason-based rationalizable with context-invariant and context-unregarding motivation
if and only if it satisﬁes Axioms 1*, 2*, and 3*.
In fact, Axiom 3* alone is equivalent to rationalizability of choice by a binary rela-
tion over options, as is well-known in the classical case where contexts are feasible sets
(Richter 1971 and Bossert and Suzumura 2010).
8It holds vacuously if no two distinct options in X have the same properties, i.e., for any x, x′ ∈ X,
x = x′ implies P(x) = P(x′). The condition is also natural because if an option x′ is property-wise
indistinguishable from a currently feasible option x, one would expect that x′ can become feasible too.
Presumably, if x, but not x′, can be feasible (together with some other options), this diﬀerence stems
from x and x′ having diﬀerent properties. We could further weaken or modify the condition, e.g., by
replacing “K′ = K ∪ {x′}” with “K′ = (K\{x : P(x) = P(x′)}) ∪ {x′}”, so that x′ is not added but
substituted for the existing feasible options that are property-wise indistinguishable from it.
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Remark 1 A choice function C satisﬁes Axiom 3* if and only if it is rationalizable by
a preference relation, i.e., there is a binary relation  on X such that for all contexts
K ∈ K,
C(K) = {x ∈ K : x  y for all y ∈ K}.
This, however, is not a reason-based rationalization, and to obtain such a rational-
ization, our two additional axioms, 1* and 2*, are needed, as Theorem 2 shows.
3.3 Reason-based rationalizability with either context-unregarding or
context-invariant motivation
We ﬁnally turn to reason-based rationalizability with one but not both kinds of context-
dependence. We begin with the case in which the agent’s motivation can be context-
variant, but not context-regarding. The axioms characterizing this case lie logically “be-
tween” Axioms 1*, 2*, and 3*, which characterize reason-based rationalizability without
any context-dependence (Theorem 2), and Axioms 1, 2, and 3, which characterize reason-
based rationalizability simpliciter (Theorem 1). Speciﬁcally, they are Axioms 1* and 3
and a new axiom that weakens Axiom 2* in the presence of 1*. We omit the details
here, since the new axiom has a complex form.
Let us now consider the case of context-invariant but possibly context-regarding mo-
tivation, which subsumes sophisticated rational behaviour, as in Polite Pauline’s case.
Surprisingly, the conditions characterizing this case are the same as those characterizing
reason-based rationalizability without any restrictions. Thus, any choice behaviour that
is reason-based rationalizable also has a rationalization with context-invariant motiva-
tion. Although this suggests that the restriction to context-invariance has no choice-
behaviourial implications, we show in Section 5 that this impression is misleading. The
restriction to context-invariance can aﬀect the prediction of choices in novel contexts
(outside K).
Before stating the present result formally, let us give an illustration. As we have
seen, Chocoholic Coco can be rationalized by a reason-based model with context-variant
motivation. This captures our informal description of Coco’s behaviour. However, a
less intuitive rationalization is also possible. It ascribes context-invariant motivation
to Coco, at the expense of making this motivation context-regarding. This alternative
model (M,≥) is the following:
• M assigns to each context the same set of motivationally salient properties M =
{big, medium, small, chocolate-oﬀering}, instead of letting motivationally salient
properties vary with the presence or absence of chocolate;
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• ≥ places any property bundles that do not contain the property “chocolate-oﬀering”
in the same indiﬀerence class (e.g., {big} ≡ {small}), and ranks property bun-
dles by size when they contain one of the size properties together with the prop-
erty “chocolate-oﬀering” (e.g., {big, chocolate-oﬀering} > {medium, chocolate-
oﬀering} > {small, chocolate-oﬀering}).
Generally, two reason-based models M and M′ are behaviourally equivalent if they
induce the same (possibly improper) choice function, i.e., if CM = CM′ .
Proposition 1 Every reason-based model is behaviourally equivalent to one with context-
invariant motivation.
Corollary 1 A choice function C has a reason-based rationalization with context-
invariant motivation if and only if it has a reason-based rationalization simpliciter.
The possibility of re-modelling any reason-based rationalization in a context-invariant
way disappears once we impose further requirements onM, such as the requirement that
motivation be context-unregarding or that it be “revealed”, as discussed in Section 4.9
As a consequence of Proposition 1, Theorem 1 can be re-stated as a characterization of
context-invariant reason-based choice:
Theorem 3 A choice function C is reason-based rationalizable with context-invariant
motivation if and only if it satisﬁes Axioms 1 and 3 (and by implication 2).
3.4 Criteria for selecting a rationalization in cases of non-uniqueness
How can we select a reason-based model (M,≥) in cases of non-uniqueness?10 This ques-
tion matters because diﬀerent models attribute to the agent diﬀerent cognitive processes,
which may diﬀer in psychological adequacy and lead to diﬀerent predictions about the
agent’s future choices, as discussed in Section 5. There are at least three kinds of criteria
for selecting a model.
9Even when this re-modelling is possible, it may sacriﬁce parsimony and psychological adequacy, as
evident from the proof of Proposition 1. Here, every property that was motivationally salient in some
context in the original model and every context property (at least every context property on which
M(K) in the original model may depend) becomes motivationally salient in the new model. Formally,
(∪K∈KM(K))∪Pcontext ⊆ M∗, where (M,≥) and (M∗,≥∗), with M∗ constant, are the original (context-
variant) and new (context-invariant) models, respectively. Thus, any eﬀects of the context on the agent’s
motivation are explained away by ascribing a very rich motivation to him.
10Non-uniqueness in the rationalization of choice behaviour is familiar from classical choice theory,
where the same choice function can often be rationalized by more than one binary relation over the
options. The relation becomes unique if the domain of the choice function (i.e., the set of contexts in
which choice is observed) is “rich”, i.e., contains all sets of one or two options.
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Revelation criteria: These require that, as far as possible:
(i) the motivational salience function M deem only those properties motivationally
salient that make an observable diﬀerence to the agent’s choice behaviour, and
(ii) the fundamental preference relation ≥ over property bundles be derived in a sys-
tematic way from the agent’s choice behaviour.
The goal is to minimize behaviourally ungrounded ascriptions of motivation and funda-
mental preference. This is the topic of Section 4.
Non-choice data: Verbal reports or neurophysiological data, such as responses to
stimuli related to various properties, may help us test hypotheses about
(i) which properties are motivationally salient for the agent in context K (and thus
belong to M(K)),
(ii) which context properties causally aﬀect motivational salience, so that M(K) may
vary as contexts K vary in those properties, and
(iii) which property bundles the agent fundamentally prefers to which others.
One might hypothesize that people have better conscious access to how they conceptual-
ize the options in a given contextK and therefore to the motivationally salient properties
in that context (those in M(K)) than to the context properties that causally aﬀect what
M(K) is (i.e., those which, empirically, would come out as signiﬁcant explanatory vari-
ables for M). If this is correct, verbal reports may be more relevant to questions (i) and
(iii) than to question (ii). Changes in M(K) might be due, for example, to subconscious
inﬂuences, as in framing or nudging eﬀects.
Parsimony criteria: We may try to select a parsimonious model (M,≥), where
(i) the sets M(K) of motivationally salient properties generated by M are (a) as small
as possible and (b) as unchanging as possible across diﬀerent K, and
(ii) the relation ≥ is as sparse as possible (e.g., deﬁned over the fewest possible property
bundles).
Often there is a trade-oﬀ between diﬀerent dimensions of parsimony. If the sets M(K)
contain only few properties, they may not be stable across diﬀerentK, and vice versa. As
the proof of Proposition 1 shows, we can always achieve context-invariance by deﬁningM
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constantly as the entire set P and the fundamental preference relation ≥ as the revealed
preference relation C over property bundles. This respects criterion (i), part (b), but
sacriﬁces parsimony in the speciﬁcation of the set of motivationally salient properties in
each context – criterion (i), part (a) – and may be psychologically implausible. It may
also conﬂict with a choice-behavioural revelation criterion and with non-choice data. In
consequence, the predictions made for future choices may be unreliable. By contrast,
if our aim is to respect criterion (i), part (a), and to make the sets M(K) as small as
possible, we can specify a partial ordering over reason-based models by deﬁning (M,≥)
to be at least as parsimonious as (M ′,≥′) if and only if (i) M(K) ⊆ M ′(K) for every K
and (ii) ≥ is a subrelation of ≥′. This partial ordering over models will often go against
criterion (i), part (b).
4 The revealed reason-based model
A familiar concept from classical choice theory is the revealed preference relation over
options, which can be inferred from the agent’s choice behaviour. Analogously, we now
introduce the revealed reason-based model, which can be inferred from the observed
choice function. Like a revealed preference relation, a revealed reason-based model has
an empirical basis. It is constructed by
• counting a property as motivationally salient in a given context if and only if it
makes a behavioural diﬀerence (in a sense deﬁned below), and
• counting a property bundle S as fundamentally preferred to another property bun-
dle T if and only if the agent is observed to choose an option x over another option
y, where x and y are revealed to be conceptualized as S and T , respectively (in a
sense deﬁned below).
We ﬁrst introduce the notion of revealed motivation, then deﬁne the revealed reason-
based model, and ﬁnally characterize the class of choice functions that are rationalizable
by such a model, also oﬀering an example of a choice function that falls outside this
class.
4.1 Revealed motivationally salient properties
Informally, our strategy for determining whether a property P is motivationally salient
for an agent in a context K is to ask whether the presence or absence of P in an option
makes a diﬀerence to the agent’s choice in contexts “like” K, i.e., contexts K ′ with the
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same context properties as K (where P(K ′) = P(K)). The agent’s behaviour in con-
texts with diﬀerent context properties is irrelevant, since it could stem from diﬀerent
motivationally salient properties. The choice of moisturizer over sunscreen in a cloudy
context provides no evidence for whether “protecting against UV radiation” is motiva-
tionally salient in a context with the context property of bright sunshine. (Recall that
our deﬁnition of a reason-based model allows contexts with diﬀerent context properties
to induce diﬀerent motivationally salient properties.)
To formalize these ideas, we begin with some preliminary terminology. Two property
bundles agree on a property P ∈ P if both or neither contain P ; otherwise, they diﬀer
in P . A property bundle S is weakly between two property bundles T and T ′ if S agrees
with each of T and T ′ on every property on which they agree. If, in addition, S is distinct
from each of T and T ′, then S is strictly between T and T ′. (For instance, {P,Q} is
strictly between {P} and {Q}, as is ∅.) For any pair of property bundles, if one of the
bundles is chosen in some context K while the other is feasible, the pair is called revealed
comparable. We now consider a context K and let K0 = {K ′ ∈ K : P(K ′) = P(K)} be
the set of contexts with the same context properties as K.
One might think that a property P is motivationally salient in context K if and
only if there is at least one context in K0 in which the agent reveals a strict preference
between two property bundles that diﬀer in P . However, this criterion is inadequate,
because the two bundles may also diﬀer in other properties. The agent may choose the
larger of two T-shirts, not because it is larger, but because it is blue. So, before we
can infer that P is motivationally salient, we must verify that the two property bundles
diﬀer minimally. They certainly do so in case they diﬀer only in P . But sometimes
diﬀerences in P go along with other diﬀerences, such as when T-shirts that diﬀer in size
also diﬀer in colour. We say that two revealed comparable property bundles S and S′
diﬀer minimally if there is no property bundle that is strictly between them and revealed
comparable to at least one of them.
This suggests the following criterion for property P to be revealed motivationally
salient in context K: there exist property bundles S and S′ such that
(rev1) S and S′ diﬀer in P ,
(rev2) S is revealed strictly preferred to S′ or vice versa, where the contexts in which
S and S′ are feasible have the same context properties as K (i.e., S ∩ Pcontext =
S′ ∩ Pcontext = P(K)), and
(rev3) S and S′ diﬀer minimally.
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In fact, this criterion is only suﬃcient for revealed motivational salience, not necessary,
because it does not capture some natural cases. Suppose, again, the options are T-shirts,
and P is the property of largeness. If every context oﬀers either only large T-shirts
or only small ones, P cannot satisfy the above three-part criterion, since no revealed
comparable sets S and S′ ever satisfy (rev2). But suppose that whenever only large T-
shirts are available the agent chooses the darkest one, and whenever only small T-shirts
are available he chooses the lightest one. Assuming there are no context properties in
P that allow us to distinguish those contexts further and to which we could attribute
the behavioural diﬀerence, it is natural to conclude that property P is motivationally
salient. The reason is that the agent’s choice between two property bundles containing
the property “large” (a large dark T-shirt and a large light one) is reversed when we
remove the property “large” from these bundles (so that we are now comparing a small
dark T-shirt and a small light one). This case is not covered by (rev1)-(rev3) and suggests
the following more general criterion.
Property P is revealed motivationally salient in context K if there exist two pairs of
property bundles (S, T ) and (S′, T ′) such that
(REV1) the two pairs diﬀer in P , i.e., either S and S′ diﬀer in P , or T and T ′ diﬀer in
P (or both),
(REV2) S is revealed preferred to T while T ′ is revealed preferred to S′ or vice versa
(with at least one preference strict), where the contexts in which S and T , or S′
and T ′, are feasible have the same context properties as K (i.e., S ∩ Pcontext =
S′ ∩ Pcontext = T ∩ Pcontext = T ′ ∩ Pcontext = P(K)), and
(REV3) the pair (S, T ) diﬀers minimally from the pair (S′, T ′), i.e., there is no other pair
(S′′, T ′′) (with S′′ revealed comparable to T ′′) such that S′′ is weakly between
S and S′ and T ′′ is weakly between T and T ′.
In our example, S and T could be the property bundles instantiated by the large dark
T-shirt and the large light T-shirt, and S′ and T ′ the bundles instantiated by the small
dark T-shirt and the small light T-shirt, respectively.
Note that (REV1)-(REV3) generalize (rev1)-(rev3):
Proposition 2 For any context K ∈ K, any property P ∈ P that satisﬁes (rev1)-(rev3)
(for some S, S′ ⊆ P) also satisﬁes (REV1)-(REV3) (for some S, S′, T, T ′ ⊆ P).
The present deﬁnition has the following natural implication:
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Lemma 2 (informal statement) The revealed preference between any two revealed com-
parable property bundles S and T (i.e., whether S C T ) depends only on
• the context properties contained in S and T (these determine the contexts K in
which S and T are feasible), and
• the properties contained in S and T that are revealed motivationally salient in such
contexts K.
We deﬁne the revealed motivational salience function as the function MC (from K
into 2P) satisfying:
for each context K, MC(K) = {P ∈ P : P is revealed motivationally salient in K}.
To illustrate, it can be checked that the revealed motivational salience functions
of the four agents in our example above – Bonnie, Pauline, Coco, and William – are
precisely the motivational salience functions that we used to rationalize their choices.11
4.2 The revealed model
We can now complete our deﬁnition of the revealed reason-based model. Given the
revealed motivational salience function MC , any option x is revealed conceptualized in
context K as
xCK = P(x,K) ∩MC(K).
We deﬁne a property bundle S to be revealed weakly fundamentally preferred to another
property bundle T , denoted S ≥C T , if, in some context K ∈ K, there are feasible
options x and y that are revealed conceptualized as xCK = S and y
C
K = T such that
x ∈ C(K). The model (MC ,≥C) is called the revealed reason-based model. It can be
checked that the reason-based models that we used to rationalize the four agents in our
example are the revealed models.
In analogy to our earlier deﬁnitions, we say that an agent’s motivation is
11For instance, in Bonnie’s case, to check that big ∈ MC(K) for any K that oﬀers no chocolate-
covered pear, verify (rev1)-(rev3) for S = {big} and S′ = {medium}; to check that big ∈ MC(K)
for any K that oﬀers chocolate-covered pears, verify (rev1)-(rev3) for S = {big, chocolate-oﬀering} and
S′ = {medium, chocolate-oﬀering}. In Pauline’s case, to check that polite ∈ MC(K) for anyK that oﬀers
no chocolate-covered pear, verify (rev1)-(rev3) for S = {big, polite} and S′ = {big}; to check the same
for any K that oﬀers chocolate-covered pears, verify (rev1)-(rev3) for S = {big, polite, chocolate-oﬀering}
and S′ = {big, chocolate-oﬀering}. To be precise, the sets MC(K) take this form as long as X contains
suﬃciently many fruits; e.g., when we just considered the property bundle S = {big, chocolate-oﬀering},
we implicitly assumed that X contains a big chocolate-covered pear.
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• revealed context-regarding if the range of the revealed motivational salience function
MC includes not only sets of option properties, and revealed context-unregarding
otherwise;
• revealed context-variant if MC is a non-constant function, and revealed context-
invariant otherwise.
In our example, Coco and William have revealed context-variant motivation, while Bon-
nie and Pauline do not; and Pauline and William have revealed context-regarding moti-
vation, while Bonnie and Coco do not.
Is every reason-based rationalizable choice function also rationalizable by the revealed
model? Recall that reason-based rationalizability simpliciter requires Axioms 1 and 3
(which, in turn, imply Axiom 2). For rationalizability by the revealed model, we must
strengthen these axioms by adding the following variant of Axiom 2.
Axiom 2** For all contexts K,K ′ ∈ K, if {xCK : x ∈ K} = {xCK′ : x ∈ K ′}, then
{xCK : x ∈ C(K)} = {xCK′ : x ∈ C(K ′)}.
Our theorem requires a technical condition. Call the set K of contexts rich if, when-
ever two property bundles S and T are simultaneously feasible in some context in K,
then K contains a context in which only S and T are feasible.
Theorem 4 Given a rich set of contexts K, a choice function C is rationalizable by the
revealed reason-based model (MC ,≥C) if and only if it satisﬁes Axioms 1, 2**, and 3.12
Surprisingly, we obtain this theorem without explicitly imposing the following variant
of Axiom 1.
Axiom 1** For all contexts K ∈ K and all options x, y ∈ K, if xCK = yCK , then
x ∈ C(K) ⇔ y ∈ C(K).
Lemma 3 Axioms 1 and 1** are equivalent.
12We may further ask whether a given choice function C is rationalizable by a model (MC ,≥) in which
MC is the revealed motivational salience function but ≥ is unrestricted. In the Appendix, we prove that,
given richness of K, a choice function C is rationalizable by some model of the form (MC ,≥) if and
only if it satisﬁes Axioms 1, 2**, and 3, in which case the model is essentially identical to the revealed
model (MC ,≥C). Two models (M,≥) and (M ′,≥′) are essentially identical if (i) M = M ′, and (ii)
the fundamental preference relations ≥ and ≥′ coincide wherever they are choice-behaviourally relevant
(i.e., S ≥ T ⇔ S ≥′ T for all property bundles S and T such that there are options x and y in some
context K that are conceptualized as P(x,K) ∩M(K) = S and P(y,K) ∩M(K) = T , respectively).
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4.3 Reason-based choice not rationalizable by the revealed model
To see that rationalizability by the revealed model is more demanding than reason-
based rationalizability simpliciter, we give an example. Suppose the options are electoral
candidates, and the contexts are elections. Let K = {K1,K2}, and consider an agent who
in context K1 votes for any candidate with the (option) property “experienced” (say,
over 20 years of political experience) and in context K2 votes for any candidate with
the (option) property “young” (say, aged below 50), where candidates of both kinds are
available in both contexts. This choice behaviour can be rationalized by a reason-based
model (M,≥) in which M(K1) = {experienced} and M(K2) = {young}, and ≥ satisﬁes
{experienced} > ∅ and {young} > ∅.
What is the revealed model? Suppose there is a perfect anti-correlation between
the properties “experienced” and “young”: a candidate in X is experienced if and only
if he or she is not young. We then have no choice-behavioural basis for determining
whether “experienced” or “young” or both are motivationally salient for our voter in
any context: the agent might have voted for an experienced candidate in context K1,
not because he cares about (and likes) experience in politicians, but because he cares
about (and dislikes) youth. As a result, both properties are revealed motivationally
salient in contexts K1 and K2. We have M
C(K1) = M
C(K2) = {experienced, young}.13
It is impossible to rationalize the agent’s choice behaviour by the revealed reason-
based model (MC ,≥C) or any other model of the form (MC ,≥), since, according to any
such model, the agent always conceptualizes every candidate either as {experienced}
or as {young}, where the agent’s choice in context K1 can only be rationalized if
{experienced} > {young}, while the choice in context K2 can only be rationalized if
{young} > {experienced}.14
Formally, the present choice behaviour violates Axiom 2** above. Although
{xCK1 : x ∈ K1} = {xCK2 : x ∈ K2} ( = {{experienced}, {young}}),
we have {xCK1 : x ∈ C(K1)} = {xCK2 : x ∈ C(K2)}, since
{xCK1 : x ∈ C(K1)} = {{experienced}} and {xCK2 : x ∈ C(K2)} = {{young}}.
This completes our discussion of revealed reason-based rationalizability.
13We assume that P contains only the option properties “experienced” and “young” and some context
properties to which the change in motivation from K1 to K2 can be attributed.
14The observation that choice may be rationalizable, but not by the revealed model, is somewhat
familiar from classical choice theory: if the goal is to rationalize choice by a complete and transitive
preference relation, then choice may have such a rationalization although the revealed preference relation
is neither complete nor transitive.
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5 Predicting choices in novel contexts
Standard choice theory is largely silent on the question of how to predict choices in novel,
previously unobserved contexts. In almost every empirical science, we make predictions
about future events (or otherwise unobserved events), based on past observations. As-
tronomers predict future solar eclipses or encounters with comets based on the past
trajectories of the relevant celestial bodies; epidemiologists predict outbreaks of future
epidemics based on past epidemiological data; and econometricians use past data of the
economy to predict its future. Choice theory is an exception in that predictions and
observations are usually taken to be the same thing: the choice function is the observed
and predicted object at once.
Genuine predictions, however, would have to be about choice contexts outside the
domain K of observed contexts, perhaps with feasible options outside the set X. If
we rationalize an agent’s choices simply by identifying a preference relation on X, we
cannot make such predictions, since we have no systematic way of extending this relation
to options outside X. Instead, we can make only two limited kinds of predictions:
• Any choice function deﬁned on a set K of contexts can predict choices when con-
texts in K recur in the future. Here, however, the preference relation on X –
the rationalization of the choice function – does no work, since even a not-yet-
rationalized choice function allows us to make the same predictions.
• A preference relation on X might be used to predict choices in contexts that are
not in K but involve only “old” options from X. In such “slightly novel” contexts,
we would predict that the agent will maximize the same preference relation over
the feasible options.
Going beyond those rather trivial predictions, we introduce a reason-based approach
towards predictions in genuinely novel contexts, involving options outside X. We ﬁrst
introduce a simple framework for predictions and then explore predictions of more and
less conservative kinds.
5.1 A framework for predictions
We take the options in X, the contexts in K, and the choice function C to refer to
previously observed choices, and introduce some further primitives:
• An extended set X+ ⊇ X of options. This contains additional options the agent
might encounter.
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• An extended set K+ ⊇ K of contexts. This contains additional choice contexts
the agent might encounter. Every “new” context K (in K+\K), like every “old”
one (in K), induces a non-empty set [K] of feasible options (as before, K may be
deﬁned non-extensionally, so as to carry additional information about the choice
environment). Again, we write K for [K] when there is no ambiguity. While in
“old” contexts (in K) only “old” options (in X) are feasible, in “new” contexts (in
K+\K) “new” options (in X+\X) can be feasible.
• The agent’s extended choice function C+ on K+. This is an extension of the
observed choice function C (i.e., the restriction of C+ to K coincides with C) and
is interpreted as the “true” choice function, capturing the choices the agent would
make when confronted with the contexts in K+.
Having observed the agent’s choices in the domain K, we wish to predict his choices
in K+. Ideally, we would like to predict as much of the “true” choice function C+ as
possible, based on the observed choice function C. We deﬁne a choice predictor as a
choice function π on some domain D ⊆ K+ (where typically K ⊆ D ⊆ K+). For each K
in D, π(K) is the predicted choice in context K. The predictor is accurate if it predicts
the agent’s choice correctly in all contexts in D, i.e., if π(K) = C+(K) for all K in D.
As we have already pointed out, a preference relation on X is insuﬃcient to deﬁne
any interesting predictors. It only allows us to deﬁne a predictor for old contexts K ∈ K
or for new contexts K ∈ K that contain only old options in X. We want to show that
reason-based rationalizations allow us to make predictions for genuinely new contexts.
We now assume that the properties in P are deﬁned over the extended set of option-
context pairs X+ × K+ (and not just over the pairs in X × K). For any domain of
contexts D ⊆ K+, a reason-based model for domain D, (M,≥), is deﬁned like a regular
reason-based model, but ranges over the set of contexts D instead of K; in particular, M
is a function from D into 2P in such a model. We use the same notational conventions
as before.
Our strategy for deﬁning a choice predictor is the following:
• Take a reason-based model M = (M,≥) for the domain K of observed choice as
given.
• Extend this to a model M′ = (M ′,≥) for some domain D with K ⊆ D ⊆ K+.
• Deﬁne a choice predictor on D as the choice function π := CM′ induced by the
extended model.
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By an extension of the model M = (M,≥) to the domain D ⊇ K we mean a reason-
based model M′ = (M ′,≥) for domain D whose restriction to K is M. Formally, (i) the
restriction of the function M ′ to the subdomain K is M , and (ii) the two models have
the same fundamental preference relation ≥.
5.2 Cautious, semi-courageous, and courageous prediction
We now deﬁne three reason-based choice predictors. Each is based on a reason-based
model M = (M,≥) by which we have rationalized the agent’s observed choice, such as
the revealed model (MC ,≥C), as discussed in Section 4.
Cautious prediction: We deﬁne the cautious choice predictor (based on M) as the
choice function π := CM′ induced by the extended model M′ = (M ′,≥) whose domain
D consists of every context K ∈ K+ such that K oﬀers the same feasible property
bundles as some observed context L ∈ K:
{P(x,K) : x ∈ K} = {P(x, L) : x ∈ L}. (1)
Note that (1) implies P(K) = P(L), so that M(K) must equal M(L). By implication,
the extension M′ of M is uniquely deﬁned.
The cautious predictor makes predictions only for choice contexts that oﬀer exactly
the same feasible property bundles as some observed context. This does not make use of
the fact that reason-based choices depend only on motivationally salient properties. For
example, we would like to predict the choices Bonnie would make from a “new” fruit
basket (in K+\K) that is identical to an “old” basket (in K) in terms of the sizes of
available fruit but not in terms of other, non-salient properties. The cautious predictor
cannot make such predictions. We now introduce a less conservative predictor that
focuses not on entire property bundles but only on bundles of motivationally salient
properties.
Semi-courageous prediction: We deﬁne the semi-courageous choice predictor (based
on M) as the choice function π := CM′ induced by the extended model
M′ = (M ′,≥) whose domain D consists of every context K ∈ K+ such that
(i) K has the same context properties as some observed context, i.e., P(K) = P(L) for
some L in K (so that M(K) = M(L)), and
(ii) the set of options as conceptualized in K (feasible bundles of motivationally salient
properties) is the same as that in some observed context, i.e., {xK : x ∈ K} = {xL :
x ∈ L′} for some L′ in K.
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Note that L and L′ in clauses (i) and (ii) can be distinct. Although the semi-courageous
predictor can predict choices in contexts oﬀering new feasible property bundles, it is still
somewhat restrictive. Clause (i) is often unnecessarily demanding. Its role is to tell us
how we must deﬁne M(K), namely as M(L). Sometimes, however, we can infer how
to deﬁne M(K) without clause (i). Imagine an agent with context-invariant motivation
(according toM), such as Bonnie. If we are willing to assume that the agent’s motivation
remains context-invariant in novel contexts, we can deﬁne M(K) as unchanged in novel
contexts K. This suggests the following, more general predictor.
Courageous prediction: We begin with a preliminary deﬁnition. In a reason-based
model M′ = (M ′,≥) for some domain D, we call a context property P causally relevant
if its presence or absence in a context can makes a diﬀerence to the agent’s set of
motivationally salient properties in that context, i.e., if there are contexts K,K ′ ∈ D
such that
(cau1) K has property P while K ′ does not (or vice versa),
(cau2) K and K ′ induce diﬀerent sets of motivationally salient properties, i.e., M ′(K) =
M ′(K ′),
(cau3) K and K ′ diﬀer minimally, i.e., there is no context K ′′ ∈ D whose set of context
properties P(K ′′) is strictly between the sets P(K) and P(K ′).15
Let CAUM′ denote the set of causally relevant context properties in model M′.16 Two
things are worth noting. First, in the important special case of context-invariant moti-
vation, no context property is causally relevant. Second, the causally relevant context
properties fully determine the agent’s set of motivationally salient properties. Formally:
Proposition 3 Let M′ = (M ′,≥) be any reason-based model (for some domain D of
contexts). Then:
(a) M′ has context-invariant motivation if and only if CAUM′ = ∅.
(b) For all contexts K and K ′,
P(K) ∩ CAUM′ = P(K ′) ∩ CAUM′ ⇒ M ′(K) = M ′(K ′).
15This clause excludes the possibility that K and K′ diﬀer in context properties unrelated to P to
which the diﬀerence in motivation between K and K′ could be causally attributed.
16If M′ is a model with revealed motivation (i.e., M′ = (MC ,≥)), causal relevance is fully determined
by observed choice, so that we may speak of revealed causal relevance and write CAUC instead of
CAUM
′
.
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We deﬁne the courageous choice predictor (based on M) as the choice function π :=
CM′ induced by the extended model M′ = (M ′,≥) whose domain D consists of every
context K ∈ K+ such that
(i*) K has the same causally relevant properties as some observed context, i.e., P(K)∩
CAUM = P(L) ∩ CAUM for some L in K; we then deﬁne M(K) as M(L);17 and
(ii) the set of options as conceptualized in K is the same as that in some observed
context, i.e., {xK : x ∈ K} = {xL : x ∈ L′} for some L′ in K.
The relationship between the three predictors: Our three predictors are increas-
ingly general, as the next remark shows.
Remark 2 Given a reason-based rationalization M of the observed choice function C,
(a) the cautious predictor extends the observed choice function C;
(b) the semi-courageous predictor extends the cautious predictor; and
(c) the courageous predictor extends the semi-courageous predictor.18
5.3 When is each choice predictor accurate?
Under what conditions can we trust cautious, semi-courageous, and courageous predic-
tions? In other words, when is each predictor accurate, i.e., when does it coincide with
the true choice function C+ on the relevant domain? Our next result shows that the
accuracy of each predictor depends on whether certain observed patterns in the agent’s
choices are robust, i.e., whether they continue to hold in contexts outside K. Our most
conservative predictor, the cautious one, relies on the robustness of a very basic pattern
(namely the fact that choice is reason-based), while the other predictors rely on the
robustness of more demanding patterns.
17By Proposition 3, the deﬁnition of M(K) does not depend on the choice of L.
18The three predictors could be extended further in a way analogous to one of the routes we mentioned
for predictions based on classical rationalizations by a preference relation. Speciﬁcally, we could extend
each predictor by dropping the requirement that any context K for which we make a prediction must
oﬀer the same feasible property bundles (in the cautious case) or options-as-conceptualized (in the semi-
courageous and courageous cases) as some observed context. The maximal generalization would replace
clause (ii) in the last deﬁnition with the requirement that {xK : x ∈ K} has a ≥-greatest element.
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Theorem 5 Given a reason-based rationalization M of the observed choice function
C,
(a) the cautious predictor is accurate if the extended choice function C+ is rationalizable
by some reason-based model;
(b) the semi-courageous predictor is accurate if the extended choice function C+ is ra-
tionalizable by some extension of M; and
(c) the courageous predictor is accurate if the extended choice function C+ is rational-
izable by some extension of M with the same causally relevant context properties.
Let us paraphrase this result. Part (a) shows that cautious predictions can be trusted
if the agent’s choices are robustly reason-based, i.e., reason-based not just in the observed
domain K but also in the extended domain K+. This seems plausible for agents with
some degree of stability in their choice behaviour. Part (b) shows that semi-courageous
predictions can be trusted if the model M rationalizes choice robustly: it not only
explains the agent’s observed choices, but can be extended to explain all novel choices
too. This requires not just that the agent is robustly reason-based, but that our reason-
based model for the observed domain K is a portion of a reason-based model for the
extended domain K+. Part (c) shows that courageous predictions can be trusted if the
modelM rationalizes choice robustly in a stronger sense: it is not just extendible to novel
contexts, but this extension requires no additional causally relevant context properties.
So, our reason-based model for K must be a portion of a reason-based model for the
extended domain K+ that already picks out all causally relevant context properties.
When are these robustness assumptions justiﬁed? The answer depends, among other
things, on how rich the domain of observed contexts K is relative to the domain K+ for
which we want to make predictions. Let us brieﬂy explain this in relation to the three
parts of our theorem.
(a) If we have observed the agent’s choice behaviour only in a small domain K, then the
fact that this behaviour is reason-based rationalizable is only limited evidence for
the hypothesis that it will continue to be reason-based rationalizable in the larger
domain K+. In the limit, if K contains only contexts that each oﬀer a single feasible
option, reason-based rationalizability is trivially satisﬁed for K and provides no
evidence at all for reason-based rationalizability in the larger domain. By contrast,
if K contains a large and representative mix of choice contexts – for example, it is a
sizeable “random sample” of contexts from K+ – then the agent’s reason-basedness
in K may be good evidence for reason-basedness in K+.
32
(b) Even if the agent’s choice behaviour is robustly reason-based, our reason-based
model for the observed domain K need not be a portion of a reason-based model for
the larger domain K+. The set of motivationally salient properties M(K) speciﬁed
for some observed context K may fail to include some property that is needed to
explain the agent’s choice in some novel context that has the same context properties
as K. In this case, a reason-based model for K+ could not be an extension of our
model for K, since it would have to specify the same set of motivationally salient
properties for all contexts with the same context properties as K. Whether this
problem is likely to occur depends on how rich the observed domain K is relative
to K+. The larger and more representative K is, the more likely it is that our
reason-based model for K is a portion of a model for all of K+.
(c) Similar remarks apply to the question of whether our model for K, over and above
being a portion of a model for K+, is likely to pick out all context properties that
are causally relevant to the agent’s motivation in the extended domain. If K con-
tains no choice contexts oﬀering luxury goods, for example, then our model for
K cannot identify the causal diﬀerence that the property “oﬀering luxury goods”
might make to the agent’s motivation in contexts with that property. Again, a large
and representative domain of observations increases our chance of coming up with a
reason-based model that identiﬁes all context properties that are causally relevant
across the extended domain.
6 Concluding remarks
We have introduced reason-based rationalizations of an agent’s choice behaviour, explic-
itly modelling an agent’s conceptualization of any choice problem, and have identiﬁed two
structurally distinct ways in which the agent’s motivation may be context-dependent.
Our framework can explain a variety of non-classical choice behaviours in a uniﬁed man-
ner and illuminate the diﬀerence between “bounded” and “sophisticated” deviations
from classical rationality. Furthermore, reason-based rationalizations allow us to predict
an agent’s choices in genuinely novel contexts, where no observations have been made.
This addresses an important shortcoming of standard choice theory.
If the modeller faces a choice between diﬀerent reason-based rationalizations for a
given choice function, the selection of one such rationalization is more than a matter of
taste or parsimony. Diﬀerent rationalizations of the same observed choice behaviour are
not equivalent, since some are typically more likely than others to extend robustly to
novel choice contexts and thus to lead to accurate predictions of future choices.
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Robustness is related to psychological adequacy. A psychologically ungrounded ex-
planation of observed choice behaviour is more likely to “fail” in novel contexts, because
it matches the observations by coincidence rather than for systematic reasons that con-
tinue to apply in novel contexts. Psychological adequacy thus matters for the sake of
predictive accuracy, regardless of whether it matters for its own sake.
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